### Impact When a custom protocol handler returned a `ProtocolResponse` with a `url` and no `session`, Electron made the upstream request through `defaultSession` instead of the session that handled the protocol. A cached response could then be reused across otherwise isolated session partitions. Apps that use `ProtocolResponse.url`, omit `ProtocolResponse.session`, and rely on separate sessions to isolate content are affected. Apps that set an explicit `session`, or that do not isolate content across sessions, are not affected. ### Workarounds Set `ProtocolResponse.session` explicitly so the request uses the intended session's cache. ### Fixed Versions * `43.0.0` * `42.5.1` * `41.9.1` * `40.10.6` ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email Electron at [[email protected]](mailto:[email protected])
### Impact When following HTTP redirects, `net.fetch()` and `net.request()` did not restrict which schemes a redirect could target. A remote server could redirect a request to a local resource, and if the app returns or forwards the response body, local file contents could be disclosed. Apps are only affected if they make `net` requests to attacker-influenced URLs with redirects followed (the default) and expose the response body. Apps that only request fixed, trusted URLs are not affected. ### Workarounds Set `redirect: 'error'` or `redirect: 'manual'` on requests to untrusted URLs and validate any redirect target before following it. ### Fixed Versions * `42.0.0-beta.3` * `41.2.1` * `40.9.0` * `39.8.8` ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email Electron at [[email protected]](mailto:[email protected])
XML::Sig versions from 0.29 before 0.72 for Perl allow signature verification bypass because verify returns true when every signature was skipped before any cryptographic check. verify in lib/XML/Sig.pm counts the `//dsig:Signature` elements into `$numsigs` and iterates over them, but two paths reach `next` before any digest or key check runs: a `SignedInfo/Reference/@URI` that resolves to no element while `$numsigs` is greater than 1, and, when `id_attr` is set, a reference that does not match the requested ID. The loop records nothing about what it checked, so when every signature takes one of those paths control reaches the unconditional `return 1` that ends verify. Two `Signature` elements whose Reference URI names an ID that no element carries is enough, as is one such element combined with `id_attr`. Any caller that passes untrusted XML to verify can receive a true return for a document in which no digest and no signature value was checked; a `cert` or `cert_text` trust anchor does not change this, because no key check runs. Versions up to 0.28 use an XML::XPath based verify that has no such skip and are not affected.
| Version | Type | Source | Base | Exp | Imp |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1 | Primary | cve.org | 7.5 | — | — |
| 3.1 | Secondary | ENISA EUVD | 7.5 | — | — |
| 3.1 | Secondary | NVD | 7.5 | 3.9 | 3.6 |