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CWE-128

Wrap-around Error

BaseIncompleteSimple3 CVEs
Wrap around errors occur whenever a value is incremented past the maximum value for its type and therefore "wraps around" to a very small, negative, or undefined value.

Common consequences3

  • AvailabilityDoS: Crash, Exit, or RestartDoS: Resource Consumption (CPU)DoS: Resource Consumption (Memory)DoS: Instability

    This weakness will generally lead to undefined behavior and therefore crashes. In the case of overflows involving loop index variables, the likelihood of infinite loops is also high.

  • IntegrityModify Memory

    If the value in question is important to data (as opposed to flow), simple data corruption has occurred. Also, if the wrap around results in other conditions such as buffer overflows, further memory corruption may occur.

  • ConfidentialityAvailabilityAccess ControlExecute Unauthorized Code or CommandsBypass Protection Mechanism

    This weakness can sometimes trigger buffer overflows which can be used to execute arbitrary code. This is usually outside the scope of a program's implicit security policy.

Potential mitigations3

  1. Requirements specification: The choice could be made to use a language that is not susceptible to these issues.

  2. Architecture and Design

    Provide clear upper and lower bounds on the scale of any protocols designed.

  3. Implementation

    Perform validation on all incremented variables to ensure that they remain within reasonable bounds.

Relationships3

CVEs referencing this CWE3

CVEDescriptionSeverityEPSSFlagsModified
CVE-2022-35258

An unauthenticated attacker can cause a denial-of-service to the following products: Ivanti Connect Secure (ICS) in versions prior to 9.1R14.3, 9.1R15.2, 9.1R16.2, and 22.2R4, Ivanti Policy Secure (IPS) in versions prior to 9.1R17 and 22.3R1, and Ivanti Neurons for Zero-Trust Access in versions prior to 22.3R1.

HIGH7.5
2.52%p83
2024-11-21
CVE-2024-23981

Wrap-around error in Linux kernel mode driver for some Intel(R) Ethernet Network Controllers and Adapters before version 28.3 may allow an authenticated user to potentially enable escalation of privilege via local access.

HIGH8.8
0.18%p8
2024-09-06
CVE-2026-54905

### Summary `Concurrent::ReentrantReadWriteLock` can incorrectly grant a write lock after one thread acquires the read lock 32,768 times. The lock stores a thread's local read and write hold counts in one integer. The low 15 bits are used for the read hold count, and bit 15 is used as `WRITE_LOCK_HELD`. After 32,768 reentrant read acquisitions, the local read count crosses into the write-lock bit. `try_write_lock` then treats the thread as already holding a write lock and returns `true` without setting the global `RUNNING_WRITER` bit. This breaks the core mutual-exclusion guarantee: the caller is told it has a write lock, but other threads can still hold or acquire read locks at the same time. ### Version Software: concurrent-ruby Version: 1.3.6 Commit: 7a1b78941c081106c20a9ca0144ac73a48d254ab ### Details The implementation uses a shared counter to track global readers/writers and a per-thread local counter to support reentrancy: ```ruby READER_BITS = 15 WRITER_BITS = 14 WAITING_WRITER = 1 << READER_BITS RUNNING_WRITER = 1 << (READER_BITS + WRITER_BITS) MAX_READERS = WAITING_WRITER - 1 MAX_WRITERS = RUNNING_WRITER - MAX_READERS - 1 WRITE_LOCK_HELD = 1 << READER_BITS READ_LOCK_MASK = WRITE_LOCK_HELD - 1 WRITE_LOCK_MASK = MAX_WRITERS ``` When a thread already holds a lock, `acquire_read_lock` increments `@HeldCount`: ```ruby if (held = @HeldCount.value) > 0 if held & READ_LOCK_MASK == 0 @Counter.update { |c| c + 1 } end @HeldCount.value = held + 1 return true end ``` After 32,768 read acquisitions, the per-thread held count becomes `32768`, which is equal to `WRITE_LOCK_HELD`. Then `try_write_lock` returns success through its "already have a write lock" branch: ```ruby def try_write_lock if (held = @HeldCount.value) >= WRITE_LOCK_HELD @HeldCount.value = held + WRITE_LOCK_HELD return true else # normal global writer acquisition path end end ``` This branch does not set the global `RUNNING_WRITER` bit. Other threads therefore do not observe an active writer and can continue holding or acquiring read locks while the caller believes it owns the write lock. ### PoC ```ruby #!/usr/bin/env ruby # frozen_string_literal: true require 'concurrent/atomic/reentrant_read_write_lock' require 'concurrent/version' require 'thread' def wait_for_queue(queue, timeout_seconds) deadline = Process.clock_gettime(Process::CLOCK_MONOTONIC) + timeout_seconds loop do return queue.pop(true) rescue ThreadError return nil if Process.clock_gettime(Process::CLOCK_MONOTONIC) >= deadline sleep 0.001 end end puts "ruby=#{RUBY_DESCRIPTION}" puts "concurrent_ruby_version=#{Concurrent::VERSION}" puts "poc=ReentrantReadWriteLock read-depth overflow grants write lock without exclusivity" lock = Concurrent::ReentrantReadWriteLock.new other_reader_ready = Queue.new other_reader_stop = Queue.new other_reader = Thread.new do lock.acquire_read_lock other_reader_ready << :held other_reader_stop.pop end wait_for_queue(other_reader_ready, 1) puts "other_thread_holds_read_lock=true" depth = Concurrent::ReentrantReadWriteLock::WRITE_LOCK_HELD depth.times { lock.acquire_read_lock } held_count = lock.instance_eval { @HeldCount.value } counter_before = lock.instance_eval { @Counter.value } puts "main_thread_read_acquisitions=#{depth}" puts "main_thread_held_count=#{held_count}" puts "counter_before_try_write=#{counter_before}" puts "running_writer_bit_before=#{(counter_before & Concurrent::ReentrantReadWriteLock::RUNNING_WRITER) != 0}" write_granted = lock.try_write_lock counter_after = lock.instance_eval { @Counter.value } puts "try_write_lock_returned=#{write_granted}" puts "counter_after_try_write=#{counter_after}" puts "running_writer_bit_after=#{(counter_after & Concurrent::ReentrantReadWriteLock::RUNNING_WRITER) != 0}" third_reader_ready = Queue.new third_reader = Thread.new do lock.acquire_read_lock third_reader_ready << :acquired end third_reader_acquired = wait_for_queue(third_reader_ready, 0.25) == :acquired puts "new_reader_acquired_while_write_claimed=#{third_reader_acquired}" if write_granted && third_reader_acquired && (counter_after & Concurrent::ReentrantReadWriteLock::RUNNING_WRITER).zero? puts 'result=REPRODUCED write lock granted without setting global writer state' else puts 'result=NOT_REPRODUCED' end third_reader.kill other_reader_stop << :stop other_reader.kill ``` ### Log evidence ```text ruby=ruby 2.6.10p210 (2022-04-12 revision 67958) [universal.arm64e-darwin25] concurrent_ruby_version=1.3.6 poc=ReentrantReadWriteLock read-depth overflow grants write lock without exclusivity other_thread_holds_read_lock=true main_thread_read_acquisitions=32768 main_thread_held_count=32768 counter_before_try_write=2 running_writer_bit_before=false try_write_lock_returned=true counter_after_try_write=2 running_writer_bit_after=false new_reader_acquired_while_write_claimed=true result=REPRODUCED write lock granted without setting global writer state ``` ### Impact This breaks the write-lock exclusivity guarantee. After the overflow, a thread can be told it has acquired the write lock while other threads can still hold or acquire read locks, allowing races and inconsistent reads of protected mutable state. ### Credit Pranjali Thakur - depthfirst ([depthfirst.com](<http://depthfirst.com>))

NONEno EPSS
2026-06-19