CVE-2026-66296

Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (XSS) vulnerability in lud oaskit allows reflected cross-site scripting via the default HTML error handler. Oaskit.ErrorHandler.Default.format_reason/4 and Oaskit.ErrorHandler.Default.reason_to_html/1 in lib/oaskit/error_handler/default.ex render request-validation failures as an HTML page whenever the request's Accept header contains html, interpolating request-controlled strings into that page without HTML escaping. The unescaped values are object keys taken from a request body or from an object or deepObject query parameter, which appear in the JSON Schema error's instance path when a schema rejects them (for example under additionalProperties: false), and the raw Content-Type header, reflected in unsupported-media-type errors when it fails to parse. Because browsers send Accept: text/html on ordinary top-level navigation, a crafted GET link is sufficient to trigger the error page; no form submission, custom Content-Type, or attacker-controlled script on the victim's side is required. A payload such as filter[</code></h2><script>alert(document.domain)</script>]=x terminates the enclosing markup and the injected script executes in the origin of the application using oaskit, giving it access to that origin's cookies, session, and same-origin responses. Both HTML error rendering and the vulnerable handler are enabled by default: Oaskit.Plugs.ValidateRequest defaults :html_errors to true and :error_handler to Oaskit.ErrorHandler.Default, so applications following the documented usage are affected without any opt-in. This issue affects oaskit: from 0.1.0 before 0.14.1.

## Summary Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (XSS) vulnerability in lud oaskit allows reflected cross-site scripting via the default HTML error handler. Oaskit.ErrorHandler.Default.format\_reason/4 and Oaskit.ErrorHandler.Default.reason\_to\_html/1 in lib/oaskit/error\_handler/default.ex render request-validation failures as an HTML page whenever the request's Accept header contains html, interpolating request-controlled strings into that page without HTML escaping. The unescaped values are object keys taken from a request body or from an object or deepObject query parameter, which appear in the JSON Schema error's instance path when a schema rejects them (for example under additionalProperties: false), and the raw Content-Type header, reflected in unsupported-media-type errors when it fails to parse. Because browsers send Accept: text/html on ordinary top-level navigation, a crafted GET link is sufficient to trigger the error page; no form submission, custom Content-Type, or attacker-controlled script on the victim's side is required. A payload such as filter\[</code></h2><script>alert(document.domain)</script>\]=x terminates the enclosing markup and the injected script executes in the origin of the application using oaskit, giving it access to that origin's cookies, session, and same-origin responses. Both HTML error rendering and the vulnerable handler are enabled by default: Oaskit.Plugs.ValidateRequest defaults :html\_errors to true and :error\_handler to Oaskit.ErrorHandler.Default, so applications following the documented usage are affected without any opt-in. This issue affects oaskit: from 0.1.0 before 0.14.1. ## Workaround Disable HTML error rendering so that validation failures are returned as JSON only: plug Oaskit.Plugs.ValidateRequest, html\_errors: false This prevents the vulnerable HTML page from being rendered at all, on any oaskit version. Alternatively, configure a custom :error\_handler that does not emit HTML built from request-derived values.