CVE-2026-54511

`@logtape/syslog` contains two related output-encoding bugs in the structured data formatting code. Both only affect deployments with `includeStructuredData: true`, which is non-default. ## 1. Unescaped C0 control characters in structured data values `escapeStructuredDataValue()` in `packages/syslog/src/syslog.ts` escapes `\`, `"`, and `]` per RFC 5424 but does not escape newline (`\n`), carriage return (`\r`), or any other C0 control characters (U+0000–U+001F): ```typescript function escapeStructuredDataValue(value: string): string { return value .replace(/\\/g, "\\\\") .replace(/"/g, '\\"') .replace(/]/g, "\\]"); // \n, \r, and other C0 control characters are not escaped } ``` TCP syslog commonly uses `\n` as a frame delimiter (RFC 6587, non-transparent framing). If an attacker-controlled value contains a literal newline, that newline terminates the current syslog frame. Bytes following the newline begin a new frame, and if they form a valid RFC 5424 header (`<PRI>1 …`), a downstream collector will accept them as a separate, authentic-looking syslog record. ## 2. Unvalidated SD-NAME keys Structured data parameter keys are inserted into the message without validation or escaping: ```typescript elements.push(`${key}="${escapedValue}"`); ``` RFC 5424 defines SD-NAME as printable US-ASCII characters excluding `=`, `]`, `"`, and space, with a maximum length of 32. A key containing any of those characters, control characters, or exceeding the length limit will produce malformed structured data. If the key itself contains an embedded `]`, it can prematurely close the structured-data element. In typical usage, property keys are developer-defined string literals and therefore safe. However, if an application forwards attacker-controlled keys as log properties—for example by spreading request headers or arbitrary metadata into a log record—this becomes a second injection path. ## Proof of concept The following Node.js snippet (no dependencies, no network required) demonstrates that the escaped value still contains a literal newline: ```javascript function escapeStructuredDataValue(value) { return value .replace(/\\/g, "\\\\") .replace(/"/g, '\\"') .replace(/]/g, "\\]"); } const payload = 'normal\n<134>1 2026-01-01T00:00:00Z forged evil - - - INJECTED'; const result = escapeStructuredDataValue(payload); console.log("Newline present after escape:", result.includes("\n")); // true ``` Tested with Node.js 22.17.1. ## Impact An attacker who controls log property values can: - forge syslog records attributed to arbitrary hosts, applications, or process IDs; - insert records with arbitrary severity or facility levels; - obscure malicious activity by injecting misleading entries around legitimate ones; - break downstream log parsers or SIEM correlation rules that rely on log integrity. Affected downstream collectors include rsyslog, syslog-ng, Splunk, Elastic Stack, and any other system using RFC 6587 non-transparent framing. ## Suggested fix ### Structured data values Escape all C0 control characters (U+0000–U+001F) in addition to `\`, `"`, and `]`. RFC 5424 does not define an escape sequence for control characters in PARAM-VALUE; the most interoperable approach is to strip or replace them: ```typescript function escapeStructuredDataValue(value: string): string { return value .replace(/\\/g, "\\\\") .replace(/"/g, '\\"') .replace(/]/g, "\\]") .replace(/[\x00-\x1f]/g, (c) => `\\x${c.charCodeAt(0).toString(16).padStart(2, "0")}` ); } ``` Alternatively, strip them entirely: `.replace(/[\x00-\x1f]/g, "")`. The right choice depends on whether downstream consumers need some representation of the original value. ### SD-NAME keys Validate each key against the RFC 5424 SD-NAME grammar before including it. Keys that fail validation should be skipped or sanitized: ```typescript // SD-NAME: printable US-ASCII, excluding '=', ']', '"', SP; max 32 chars const SD_NAME_RE = /^[!-<>-Z\\^-z|~]{1,32}$/; for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(record.properties)) { if (!SD_NAME_RE.test(key)) continue; const escapedValue = escapeStructuredDataValue(String(value)); elements.push(`${key}="${escapedValue}"`); } ```

`@logtape/syslog` contains two related output-encoding bugs in the structured data formatting code. Both only affect deployments with `includeStructuredData: true`, which is non-default. ## 1. Unescaped C0 control characters in structured data values `escapeStructuredDataValue()` in `packages/syslog/src/syslog.ts` escapes `\`, `"`, and `]` per RFC 5424 but does not escape newline (`\n`), carriage return (`\r`), or any other C0 control characters (U+0000–U+001F): ```typescript function escapeStructuredDataValue(value: string): string { return value .replace(/\\/g, "\\\\") .replace(/"/g, '\\"') .replace(/]/g, "\\]"); // \n, \r, and other C0 control characters are not escaped } ``` TCP syslog commonly uses `\n` as a frame delimiter (RFC 6587, non-transparent framing). If an attacker-controlled value contains a literal newline, that newline terminates the current syslog frame. Bytes following the newline begin a new frame, and if they form a valid RFC 5424 header (`<PRI>1 …`), a downstream collector will accept them as a separate, authentic-looking syslog record. ## 2. Unvalidated SD-NAME keys Structured data parameter keys are inserted into the message without validation or escaping: ```typescript elements.push(`${key}="${escapedValue}"`); ``` RFC 5424 defines SD-NAME as printable US-ASCII characters excluding `=`, `]`, `"`, and space, with a maximum length of 32. A key containing any of those characters, control characters, or exceeding the length limit will produce malformed structured data. If the key itself contains an embedded `]`, it can prematurely close the structured-data element. In typical usage, property keys are developer-defined string literals and therefore safe. However, if an application forwards attacker-controlled keys as log properties—for example by spreading request headers or arbitrary metadata into a log record—this becomes a second injection path. ## Proof of concept The following Node.js snippet (no dependencies, no network required) demonstrates that the escaped value still contains a literal newline: ```javascript function escapeStructuredDataValue(value) { return value .replace(/\\/g, "\\\\") .replace(/"/g, '\\"') .replace(/]/g, "\\]"); } const payload = 'normal\n<134>1 2026-01-01T00:00:00Z forged evil - - - INJECTED'; const result = escapeStructuredDataValue(payload); console.log("Newline present after escape:", result.includes("\n")); // true ``` Tested with Node.js 22.17.1. ## Impact An attacker who controls log property values can: - forge syslog records attributed to arbitrary hosts, applications, or process IDs; - insert records with arbitrary severity or facility levels; - obscure malicious activity by injecting misleading entries around legitimate ones; - break downstream log parsers or SIEM correlation rules that rely on log integrity. Affected downstream collectors include rsyslog, syslog-ng, Splunk, Elastic Stack, and any other system using RFC 6587 non-transparent framing. ## Suggested fix ### Structured data values Escape all C0 control characters (U+0000–U+001F) in addition to `\`, `"`, and `]`. RFC 5424 does not define an escape sequence for control characters in PARAM-VALUE; the most interoperable approach is to strip or replace them: ```typescript function escapeStructuredDataValue(value: string): string { return value .replace(/\\/g, "\\\\") .replace(/"/g, '\\"') .replace(/]/g, "\\]") .replace(/[\x00-\x1f]/g, (c) => `\\x${c.charCodeAt(0).toString(16).padStart(2, "0")}` ); } ``` Alternatively, strip them entirely: `.replace(/[\x00-\x1f]/g, "")`. The right choice depends on whether downstream consumers need some representation of the original value. ### SD-NAME keys Validate each key against the RFC 5424 SD-NAME grammar before including it. Keys that fail validation should be skipped or sanitized: ```typescript // SD-NAME: printable US-ASCII, excluding '=', ']', '"', SP; max 32 chars const SD_NAME_RE = /^[!-<>-Z\\^-z|~]{1,32}$/; for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(record.properties)) { if (!SD_NAME_RE.test(key)) continue; const escapedValue = escapeStructuredDataValue(String(value)); elements.push(`${key}="${escapedValue}"`); } ```