CVE-2026-52809

Gogs's password-reset tokens use account-activation lifetime, ignoring RESET_PASSWORD_CODE_LIVES in gogs.io/gogs. NOTE: The source advisory for this report contains additional versions that could not be automatically mapped to standard Go module versions. (If this is causing false-positive reports from vulnerability scanners, please suggest an edit to the report.) The additional affected modules and versions are: gogs.io/gogs before v0.14.3.

## Summary Password-reset tokens are generated using `conf.Auth.ActivateCodeLives` (the account-activation lifetime), not `conf.Auth.ResetPasswordCodeLives`. The token lifetime is baked into the token itself at generation time and is re-extracted from the token at verification time, making `RESET_PASSWORD_CODE_LIVES` irrelevant to actual enforcement. When an administrator configures a shorter reset window (e.g., 10 minutes) for compliance or security reasons, reset tokens remain exploitable for the full activation lifetime instead, while the reset email falsely advertises the shorter expiry. ## Severity **Medium** (CVSS 3.1: 6.8) `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N` - **Attack Vector:** Network — the reset endpoint is reachable over HTTP/S. - **Attack Complexity:** High — successful exploitation requires (1) the instance to be configured with `RESET_PASSWORD_CODE_LIVES < ACTIVATE_CODE_LIVES`, AND (2) the attacker to have intercepted the victim's reset token (e.g., from a compromised or shared email inbox). - **Privileges Required:** None — no Gogs account is required. - **User Interaction:** Required — the victim must have triggered a password-reset request. - **Scope:** Unchanged — the impact is confined to the victim's Gogs account. - **Confidentiality Impact:** High — successful exploitation leads to account takeover, exposing all private repositories and data. - **Integrity Impact:** High — the attacker can change the victim's password and gain full write access. - **Availability Impact:** None. ## Affected component - `internal/userx/userx.go` — `GenerateActivateCode()` (line 39) - `internal/email/email.go` — `SendResetPasswordMail()` (line 132) - `internal/route/user/auth.go` — `verifyUserActiveCode()` (lines 426–439) and `ResetPasswdPost()` (line 621) ## CWE - **CWE-324**: Use of a Key Past Its Expiration Date - **CWE-613**: Insufficient Session Expiration ## Description ### The reset token lifetime is hardcoded to `ActivateCodeLives` at generation `GenerateActivateCode` (called for both account activation and password reset) bakes `conf.Auth.ActivateCodeLives` — not `ResetPasswordCodeLives` — into the token as a 6-digit field: ```go // internal/userx/userx.go:36-46 func GenerateActivateCode(userID int64, email, name, password, rands string) string { code := tool.CreateTimeLimitCode( fmt.Sprintf("%d%s%s%s%s", userID, email, strings.ToLower(name), password, rands), conf.Auth.ActivateCodeLives, // ← always ActivateCodeLives, never ResetPasswordCodeLives nil, ) code += hex.EncodeToString([]byte(strings.ToLower(name))) return code } ``` `CreateTimeLimitCode` embeds the `minutes` value at positions 12–17 of the token: ``` Token format: YYYYMMDDHHMM (12) | 000180 (6-digit lives) | SHA1 (40) | hex-username ``` `SendResetPasswordMail` calls `u.GenerateEmailActivateCode(u.Email())` — which resolves to `GenerateActivateCode` — with no option to pass a different lifetime: ```go // internal/email/email.go:131-132 func SendResetPasswordMail(c *macaron.Context, u User) error { return SendUserMail(c, u, tmplAuthResetPassword, u.GenerateEmailActivateCode(u.Email()), ...) } ``` ### `ResetPasswordCodeLives` is used only for display, not enforcement `VerifyTimeLimitCode` discards the `minutes` argument and re-extracts the lifetime directly from the token itself: ```go // internal/tool/tool.go:62-86 func VerifyTimeLimitCode(data string, minutes int, code string) bool { start := code[:12] lives := code[12:18] if d, err := strconv.Atoi(lives); err == nil { minutes = d // ← argument overridden by value baked into the token } retCode := CreateTimeLimitCode(data, minutes, start) if retCode == code && minutes > 0 { before, _ := time.ParseInLocation("200601021504", start, time.Local) if before.Add(time.Minute * time.Duration(minutes)).Unix() > now.Unix() { return true } } return false } ``` The `verifyUserActiveCode` caller passes `conf.Auth.ActivateCodeLives` as `minutes`, but it makes no difference: ```go // internal/route/user/auth.go:426-439 func verifyUserActiveCode(code string) (user *database.User) { minutes := conf.Auth.ActivateCodeLives // passed to VerifyTimeLimitCode but immediately overridden if user = parseUserFromCode(code); user != nil { prefix := code[:tool.TimeLimitCodeLength] data := strconv.FormatInt(user.ID, 10) + user.Email + user.LowerName + user.Password + user.Rands if tool.VerifyTimeLimitCode(data, minutes, prefix) { return user } } return nil } ``` `ResetPasswdPost` validates the reset token through `verifyUserActiveCode`, so it inherits the same flaw: ```go // internal/route/user/auth.go:621 if u := verifyUserActiveCode(code); u != nil { ``` `ResetPasswordCodeLives` appears only in email template data and in the admin config display — it has zero effect on actual token validation: ```go // internal/email/email.go:109 — template data only, not used to generate the token "ResetPwdCodeLives": conf.Auth.ResetPasswordCodeLives / 60, ``` ### Full execution chain 1. **Victim requests reset**: `POST /user/forget_password` → `SendResetPasswordMail` generates a token embedding `ActivateCodeLives = 180` at bytes 12–17. 2. **Email delivered**: The reset email says "link valid for 10 minutes" (from `ResetPwdCodeLives` in the template) but the embedded lifetime is 180. 3. **`RESET_PASSWORD_CODE_LIVES` window closes**: After 10 minutes the victim believes the link has expired. 4. **Attacker submits the token**: `POST /user/reset_password?code=<TOKEN>` → `ResetPasswdPost` → `verifyUserActiveCode` → `VerifyTimeLimitCode` extracts `000180` from the token → confirms the token has not yet reached the 180-minute mark → returns the user object → password is updated. 5. **Account takeover**: Attacker sets a new password and authenticates as the victim. ## Proof of Concept ```ini # app.ini configuration that exposes the bug: [auth] ACTIVATE_CODE_LIVES = 180 RESET_PASSWORD_CODE_LIVES = 10 ``` ```bash # 1) Request password reset for victim account curl -i -X POST -d '[email protected]' http://HOST/user/forget_password # 2) Obtain the reset link from the email. # Wait 11 minutes (past RESET_PASSWORD_CODE_LIVES, within ACTIVATE_CODE_LIVES). # 3) Submit the "expired" reset code — it still succeeds curl -i -X POST \ -d 'code=<CODE_FROM_EMAIL>&password=AttackerNewPass' \ 'http://HOST/user/reset_password?code=<CODE_FROM_EMAIL>' # Expected: HTTP 302 redirect to /user/login — password successfully changed # despite the reset window having "closed" 10 minutes ago. ``` ## Impact - An administrator who sets `RESET_PASSWORD_CODE_LIVES` shorter than `ACTIVATE_CODE_LIVES` to limit the window of exposure for intercepted reset emails gets no security benefit from that configuration. - Reset tokens remain valid for the full activation lifetime (default 3 hours), giving an attacker who has intercepted a reset email a much larger window to use it. - The reset email actively misleads users by advertising a shorter expiry that is never enforced. - All password-reset operations are affected; there is no per-user or per-request way to issue a correctly-expiring token. ## Recommended remediation ### Option 1: Add a `ResetPasswordCodeLives`-aware generation function (preferred) Introduce a dedicated code-generation path that passes `conf.Auth.ResetPasswordCodeLives` instead of `ActivateCodeLives`: ```go // internal/userx/userx.go func GenerateResetPasswordCode(userID int64, email, name, password, rands string) string { code := tool.CreateTimeLimitCode( fmt.Sprintf("%d%s%s%s%s", userID, email, strings.ToLower(name), password, rands), conf.Auth.ResetPasswordCodeLives, // ← correct lifetime nil, ) code += hex.EncodeToString([]byte(strings.ToLower(name))) return code } ``` Update `email.User` to expose this through the interface: ```go // internal/email/email.go interface GenerateResetPasswordCode(email string) string ``` Update `SendResetPasswordMail` to call it: ```go func SendResetPasswordMail(c *macaron.Context, u User) error { return SendUserMail(c, u, tmplAuthResetPassword, u.GenerateResetPasswordCode(u.Email()), ...) } ``` Because `VerifyTimeLimitCode` reads the lifetime from the token itself, no change to the verification side is required — tokens generated with `ResetPasswordCodeLives` will automatically expire at the correct time. ### Option 2: Validate the extracted lifetime against the configured maximum Add a post-extraction check in `VerifyTimeLimitCode` or in the reset-specific verification function to reject tokens whose embedded lifetime exceeds `ResetPasswordCodeLives`: ```go // in verifyUserActiveCode, after extracting the prefix: embeddedLives := ... // parse positions 12-18 of the code if embeddedLives > conf.Auth.ResetPasswordCodeLives { return nil // reject tokens with a longer-than-allowed lifetime } ``` This is a defence-in-depth measure but does not fix the root cause; Option 1 is preferred. ## Credit This vulnerability was discovered and reported by [bugbunny.ai](https://bugbunny.ai).