Symfony is a PHP framework for web and console applications and a set of reusable PHP components. Prior to 6.4.40, 7.4.12, and 8.0.12,…
GitHub_M·CWE-306·Published 2026-05-29
Symfony is a PHP framework for web and console applications and a set of reusable PHP components. Prior to 6.4.40, 7.4.12, and 8.0.12, TwilioRequestParser::doParse() received the configured webhook secret but ignored the X-Twilio-Signature HMAC header, allowing unauthenticated POST requests to inject forged Twilio status payloads. This issue is fixed in versions 6.4.40, 7.4.12, and 8.0.12.
Symfony is a PHP framework for web and console applications and a set of reusable PHP components. Prior to 6.4.40, 7.4.12, and 8.0.12, TwilioRequestParser::doParse() received the configured webhook secret but ignored the X-Twilio-Signature HMAC header, allowing unauthenticated POST requests to inject forged Twilio status payloads. This issue is fixed in versions 6.4.40, 7.4.12, and 8.0.12.
### Description The Twilio SMS notifier bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the status callbacks Twilio POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Twilio-Signature` HMAC header Twilio sends with each request. As a result, an application that wires up the Twilio webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged status payloads, fake delivered / failed / undelivered events, leading to delivery-metrics fraud, downstream automation triggers, etc. ### Resolution `TwilioRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Twilio-Signature` header (HMAC-SHA1 over the full request URL concatenated with the alphabetically-sorted POST parameters, base64-encoded, keyed with the Twilio account auth token) before further processing, using a constant-time comparison. When no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: signature verification remains opt-in, but it is now actually enforced once opted in. Applications behind a TLS-terminating reverse proxy must configure `framework.trusted_proxies` and `framework.trusted_headers` so that `Request::getUri()` returns the public URL Twilio signed. The patch for this issue is available [here](https://github.com/symfony/symfony/commit/8545fb2af6c07dfb5ef0fc8d9bccf86db2c94356) for branch 6.4. ### Credits Symfony would like to thank Himanshu Anand for reporting the issue and Nicolas Grekas for providing the fix.
### Description The Twilio SMS notifier bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the status callbacks Twilio POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Twilio-Signature` HMAC header Twilio sends with each request. As a result, an application that wires up the Twilio webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged status payloads, fake delivered / failed / undelivered events, leading to delivery-metrics fraud, downstream automation triggers, etc. ### Resolution `TwilioRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Twilio-Signature` header (HMAC-SHA1 over the full request URL concatenated with the alphabetically-sorted POST parameters, base64-encoded, keyed with the Twilio account auth token) before further processing, using a constant-time comparison. When no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: signature verification remains opt-in, but it is now actually enforced once opted in. Applications behind a TLS-terminating reverse proxy must configure `framework.trusted_proxies` and `framework.trusted_headers` so that `Request::getUri()` returns the public URL Twilio signed. The patch for this issue is available [here](https://github.com/symfony/symfony/commit/8545fb2af6c07dfb5ef0fc8d9bccf86db2c94356) for branch 6.4. ### Credits Symfony would like to thank Himanshu Anand for reporting the issue and Nicolas Grekas for providing the fix.
| Version | Type | Source | Base | Exp | Impact | Vector |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1 | Primary | NVD | 5.3 | 3.9 | 1.4 | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N |
| 4.0 | Primary | cve.org | 6.9 | — | — | CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N |
| 4.0 | Primary | cve.org | 6.9 | — | — | CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N |
| 4.0 | Secondary | ENISA EUVD | 6.9 | — | — | CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N |
| 4.0 | Secondary | NVD | 6.9 | — | — | CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X |
| 4.0 | Secondary | GHSA | 4.6 | — | — | CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U |