CVE-2026-46412

## Summary Between 2026-05-11 20:19 UTC and 22:56 UTC, an attacker used a compromised npm publish token to publish 18 malicious versions of `@beproduct/nestjs-auth` (0.1.2 through 0.1.19). The packages contained payloads from the **Mini Shai-Hulud** npm supply-chain worm campaign described by [Aikido Security](https://www.aikido.dev/blog/mini-shai-hulud-is-back-tanstack-compromised). npm Security removed the malicious versions from the registry shortly after publication, but anyone who ran `npm install @beproduct/nestjs-auth` resolving to any version in the affected range during that window executed the malicious postinstall script and is potentially compromised. Version `0.1.20` is a clean republish from the original `0.1.1` source tree. ## Impact The postinstall payload attempted to harvest: - npm tokens (from `~/.npmrc`) - GitHub personal access tokens, OAuth tokens (`gho_*`), and Actions OIDC tokens - AWS credentials (from environment variables and `~/.aws/credentials`) - HashiCorp Vault tokens - Other secrets present in environment variables Exfiltration target: `https://filev2.getsession.org`. The worm also wrote persistence artefacts (`tanstack_runner.js`, `router_init.js`, `setup.mjs`, plus IDE-hook configurations in `.claude/` and `.vscode/`) into the developer's working tree where the malicious install ran. ## Indicators of compromise | Type | Value | |---|---| | File name (payload) | `tanstack_runner.js`, `router_init.js`, `router_runtime.js` | | SHA-256 (tanstack_runner.js) | `2ec78d556d696e208927cc503d48e4b5eb56b31abc2870c2ed2e98d6be27fc96` | | SHA-256 (router_init.js) | `ab4fcadaec49c03278063dd269ea5eef82d24f2124a8e15d7b90f2fa8601266c` | | Exfil endpoint | `filev2.getsession.org` | | Cloud metadata probe | `169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/` | | npm token endpoint | `registry.npmjs.org/-/npm/v1/tokens` | | Vault probe | `vault.svc.cluster.local:8200` | | IDE hook pattern | `.claude/settings.json` `SessionStart` hook + `.vscode/tasks.json` `runOn: "folderOpen"` running `node .claude/setup.mjs` or `node .vscode/setup.mjs` | ## Mitigation If you installed any version in the range `>=0.1.2 <=0.1.19`: 1. **Remove the package and clean the npm cache:** ```bash npm uninstall @beproduct/nestjs-auth npm cache clean --force ``` 2. **Install the clean version:** ```bash npm install @beproduct/[email protected] ``` 3. **Rotate every credential present in the install environment**, including: - All npm publish tokens (`https://www.npmjs.com/settings/<you>/tokens`) - All GitHub PATs and OAuth tokens (`https://github.com/settings/applications` + `https://github.com/settings/tokens`) - AWS access keys - HashiCorp Vault tokens - Any other secret that was in env vars or config files at install time 4. **Scan affected hosts** for the indicators of compromise above. If any are found, treat the host as compromised and reimage. 5. **Check committed repository history** for unexpected additions in `.claude/` or `.vscode/` directories — the worm is known to commit `setup.mjs` + hook configs to PR branches via automated agent runtimes. ## Timeline (UTC) | Time | Event | |---|---| | 2026-05-11 20:19:43 | First malicious version (`0.1.2`) published | | 2026-05-11 22:56:39 | Final malicious version (`0.1.19`) published — 18 versions in 2h37m | | 2026-05-12 ~14:12 | npm Security removes the malicious versions from the registry | | 2026-05-13 | BeProduct discovers the incident via Aikido's public disclosure | | 2026-05-14 | Compromised npm publish token revoked; BeProduct GitHub OAuth credentials rotated | | 2026-05-14 | Clean release `0.1.20` published; this advisory filed | ## Root cause The compromised npm publish token was harvested by a Mini-Shai-Hulud-infected transitive dependency in an automated GitHub coding-agent runtime that had read access to the `NPM_TOKEN` GitHub Actions secret for an unrelated repository under the same npm publisher account. The publish itself was performed by the attacker against the public npm registry; the source repository for this package was not modified by the attacker. ## References - https://www.aikido.dev/blog/mini-shai-hulud-is-back-tanstack-compromised - https://www.aikido.dev/blog/checklist-github-actions ```

## Summary Between 2026-05-11 20:19 UTC and 22:56 UTC, an attacker used a compromised npm publish token to publish 18 malicious versions of `@beproduct/nestjs-auth` (0.1.2 through 0.1.19). The packages contained payloads from the **Mini Shai-Hulud** npm supply-chain worm campaign described by [Aikido Security](https://www.aikido.dev/blog/mini-shai-hulud-is-back-tanstack-compromised). npm Security removed the malicious versions from the registry shortly after publication, but anyone who ran `npm install @beproduct/nestjs-auth` resolving to any version in the affected range during that window executed the malicious postinstall script and is potentially compromised. Version `0.1.20` is a clean republish from the original `0.1.1` source tree. ## Impact The postinstall payload attempted to harvest: - npm tokens (from `~/.npmrc`) - GitHub personal access tokens, OAuth tokens (`gho_*`), and Actions OIDC tokens - AWS credentials (from environment variables and `~/.aws/credentials`) - HashiCorp Vault tokens - Other secrets present in environment variables Exfiltration target: `https://filev2.getsession.org`. The worm also wrote persistence artefacts (`tanstack_runner.js`, `router_init.js`, `setup.mjs`, plus IDE-hook configurations in `.claude/` and `.vscode/`) into the developer's working tree where the malicious install ran. ## Indicators of compromise | Type | Value | |---|---| | File name (payload) | `tanstack_runner.js`, `router_init.js`, `router_runtime.js` | | SHA-256 (tanstack_runner.js) | `2ec78d556d696e208927cc503d48e4b5eb56b31abc2870c2ed2e98d6be27fc96` | | SHA-256 (router_init.js) | `ab4fcadaec49c03278063dd269ea5eef82d24f2124a8e15d7b90f2fa8601266c` | | Exfil endpoint | `filev2.getsession.org` | | Cloud metadata probe | `169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/` | | npm token endpoint | `registry.npmjs.org/-/npm/v1/tokens` | | Vault probe | `vault.svc.cluster.local:8200` | | IDE hook pattern | `.claude/settings.json` `SessionStart` hook + `.vscode/tasks.json` `runOn: "folderOpen"` running `node .claude/setup.mjs` or `node .vscode/setup.mjs` | ## Mitigation If you installed any version in the range `>=0.1.2 <=0.1.19`: 1. **Remove the package and clean the npm cache:** ```bash npm uninstall @beproduct/nestjs-auth npm cache clean --force ``` 2. **Install the clean version:** ```bash npm install @beproduct/[email protected] ``` 3. **Rotate every credential present in the install environment**, including: - All npm publish tokens (`https://www.npmjs.com/settings/<you>/tokens`) - All GitHub PATs and OAuth tokens (`https://github.com/settings/applications` + `https://github.com/settings/tokens`) - AWS access keys - HashiCorp Vault tokens - Any other secret that was in env vars or config files at install time 4. **Scan affected hosts** for the indicators of compromise above. If any are found, treat the host as compromised and reimage. 5. **Check committed repository history** for unexpected additions in `.claude/` or `.vscode/` directories — the worm is known to commit `setup.mjs` + hook configs to PR branches via automated agent runtimes. ## Timeline (UTC) | Time | Event | |---|---| | 2026-05-11 20:19:43 | First malicious version (`0.1.2`) published | | 2026-05-11 22:56:39 | Final malicious version (`0.1.19`) published — 18 versions in 2h37m | | 2026-05-12 ~14:12 | npm Security removes the malicious versions from the registry | | 2026-05-13 | BeProduct discovers the incident via Aikido's public disclosure | | 2026-05-14 | Compromised npm publish token revoked; BeProduct GitHub OAuth credentials rotated | | 2026-05-14 | Clean release `0.1.20` published; this advisory filed | ## Root cause The compromised npm publish token was harvested by a Mini-Shai-Hulud-infected transitive dependency in an automated GitHub coding-agent runtime that had read access to the `NPM_TOKEN` GitHub Actions secret for an unrelated repository under the same npm publisher account. The publish itself was performed by the attacker against the public npm registry; the source repository for this package was not modified by the attacker. ## References - https://www.aikido.dev/blog/mini-shai-hulud-is-back-tanstack-compromised - https://www.aikido.dev/blog/checklist-github-actions ```

“@beproduct/nestjs-auth” es un módulo de autenticación de NestJS para BeProduct IDS (Identity Server) con soporte OpenID Connect. Entre el 11-05-2026 20:19 UTC y las 22:56 UTC, un atacante utilizó un token de publicación de npm comprometido para publicar 18 versiones maliciosas de “@beproduct/nestjs-auth” (0.1.2 a 0.1.19). La carga útil de postinstalación intentó recolectar tokens de npm (de “~/.npmrc”); tokens de acceso personal de GitHub, tokens de OAuth (“gho_*”), y tokens OIDC de Actions; credenciales de AWS (de variables de entorno y “~/.aws/credentials”); tokens de HashiCorp Vault; y otros secretos presentes en las variables de entorno. La versión “0.1.20” es una republicación limpia del árbol de código fuente original “0.1.1”. Cualquiera que haya instalado cualquier versión en el rango “>=0.1.2 menor o igual que 0.1.19” debería eliminar el paquete y limpiar la caché de npm; instalar la versión limpia; rotar cada credencial presente en el entorno de instalación, incluyendo todos los tokens de publicación de npm, todos los PATs y tokens de OAuth de GitHub, claves de acceso de AWS, tokens de HashiCorp Vault, y cualquier otro secreto que estuviera en las variables de entorno o archivos de configuración en el momento de la instalación; escanear los hosts afectados en busca de indicadores de compromiso y, si se encuentra alguno, tratar el host como comprometido y reinstalar la imagen; y verificar el historial del repositorio en busca de adiciones inesperadas en los directorios “.claude/” o “.vscode/”. Se sabe que el gusano realiza commits de “setup.mjs” + configuraciones de hook a las ramas de PR a través de tiempos de ejecución de agentes automatizados.