Fiber is an Express inspired web framework written in Go. Prior to 3.3.0 and 2.52.14, the BalancerForward proxy helper in…
GitHub_M·CWE-290·Published 2026-07-02
Fiber is an Express inspired web framework written in Go. Prior to 3.3.0 and 2.52.14, the BalancerForward proxy helper in middleware/proxy/proxy.go uses Header.Add() instead of Header.Set() when injecting X-Real-IP, allowing an attacker-supplied first X-Real-IP value to be forwarded to upstream servers for logging, rate limiting, and access control. This issue is fixed in version 3.3.0 and 2.52.14.
Fiber is an Express inspired web framework written in Go. Prior to 3.3.0 and 2.52.14, the BalancerForward proxy helper in middleware/proxy/proxy.go uses Header.Add() instead of Header.Set() when injecting X-Real-IP, allowing an attacker-supplied first X-Real-IP value to be forwarded to upstream servers for logging, rate limiting, and access control. This issue is fixed in version 3.3.0 and 2.52.14.
GoFiber Vulnerable to X-Real-IP Spoofing via Header.Add() in BalancerForward in github.com/gofiber/fiber
## Summary The `BalancerForward` proxy helper in GoFiber uses `Header.Add()` instead of `Header.Set()` when injecting the `X-Real-IP` header. This appends the real client IP as a second header value rather than replacing any attacker-supplied value. Upstream servers that read the first `X-Real-IP` header (nginx, Express, most HTTP servers) use the attacker's spoofed IP for logging, rate limiting, and access control. ## Vulnerable Code **File:** `middleware/proxy/proxy.go`, lines 270-285 ```go func BalancerForward(servers []string, clients ...*fasthttp.Client) fiber.Handler { r := &roundrobin{ current: 0, pool: servers, } return func(c fiber.Ctx) error { server := r.get() if !strings.HasPrefix(server, "http") { server = "http://" + server } c.Request().Header.Add("X-Real-IP", c.IP()) // line 282: Add, not Set return Do(c, server+c.OriginalURL(), clients...) } } ``` ## Data Flow 1. Attacker sends request with `X-Real-IP: 10.0.0.1` (spoofed internal IP) 2. `BalancerForward` handler executes at line 282 3. `c.Request().Header.Add("X-Real-IP", c.IP())` APPENDS the real IP as a second header 4. Upstream server receives: `X-Real-IP: 10.0.0.1` AND `X-Real-IP: <real-attacker-ip>` 5. Most HTTP servers (nginx, Node.js, Apache) read the FIRST value 6. Upstream uses `10.0.0.1` for all IP-dependent logic ## Impact - **Rate limit bypass:** IP-based rate limiting at the upstream uses the spoofed IP, allowing unlimited requests - **IP ACL bypass:** Internal IP allowlists (e.g., admin panels restricted to `10.0.0.0/8`) can be bypassed - **Audit log poisoning:** Security logs record the spoofed IP, making incident investigation unreliable - **Geolocation bypass:** IP-based geofencing or region restrictions are circumvented ## Fix Replace `Header.Add()` with `Header.Set()` at line 282: ```go c.Request().Header.Set("X-Real-IP", c.IP()) ``` `Header.Set()` replaces any existing header value, ensuring only the real client IP is forwarded.
| Version | Type | Source | Base | Exp | Impact | Vector |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1 | Primary | cve.org | 5.3 | — | — | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N |
| 3.1 | Primary | cve.org | 5.3 | — | — | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N |
| 3.1 | Secondary | GHSA | 5.3 | — | — | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N |
| 3.1 | Secondary | NVD | 5.3 | 3.9 | 1.4 | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N |
| 3.1 | Secondary | ENISA EUVD | 5.3 | — | — | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N |