Youki is a container runtime written in Rust. In versions 0.5.6 and below, the initial validation of the source /dev/null is insufficient,…
GitHub_M·CWE-363·Published 2025-11-05
Youki is a container runtime written in Rust. In versions 0.5.6 and below, the initial validation of the source /dev/null is insufficient, allowing container escape when youki utilizes bind mounting the container's /dev/null as a file mask. This issue is fixed in version 0.5.7.
Youki is a container runtime written in Rust. In versions 0.5.6 and below, the initial validation of the source /dev/null is insufficient, allowing container escape when youki utilizes bind mounting the container's /dev/null as a file mask. This issue is fixed in version 0.5.7.
### Impact ### youki utilizes bind mounting the container's `/dev/null` as a file mask. When performing this operation, the initial validation of the source `/dev/null` was insufficient. Specifically, we initially failed to verify whether `/dev/null` was genuinely present. However, we did perform validation to ensure that the `/dev/null` path existed within the container, including checking for symbolic links. Additionally, there was a vulnerability in the timing between validation and the actual mount operation. As a result, by replacing `/dev/null` with a symbolic link, we can bind-mount arbitrary files from the host system. This is a different project, but the core logic is similar to the CVE in runc. Issues were identified in runc, and verification was also conducted in youki to confirm the problems. https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/security/advisories/GHSA-9493-h29p-rfm2 ### Credits Thanks to Lei Wang (@ssst0n3 from Huawei) for finding and reporting the original runc's vulnerability (Attack 1), and Li Fubang (@lifubang from acmcoder.com, CIIC) for discovering another attack vector in runc (Attack 2) based on @ssst0n3's initial findings. Also, @cyphar helped youki in finding the problem.
### Impact ### youki utilizes bind mounting the container's `/dev/null` as a file mask. When performing this operation, the initial validation of the source `/dev/null` was insufficient. Specifically, we initially failed to verify whether `/dev/null` was genuinely present. However, we did perform validation to ensure that the `/dev/null` path existed within the container, including checking for symbolic links. Additionally, there was a vulnerability in the timing between validation and the actual mount operation. As a result, by replacing `/dev/null` with a symbolic link, we can bind-mount arbitrary files from the host system. This is a different project, but the core logic is similar to the CVE in runc. Issues were identified in runc, and verification was also conducted in youki to confirm the problems. https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/security/advisories/GHSA-9493-h29p-rfm2 ### Credits Thanks to Lei Wang (@ssst0n3 from Huawei) for finding and reporting the original runc's vulnerability (Attack 1), and Li Fubang (@lifubang from acmcoder.com, CIIC) for discovering another attack vector in runc (Attack 2) based on @ssst0n3's initial findings. Also, @cyphar helped youki in finding the problem.
| Version | Type | Source | Base | Exp | Impact | Vector |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1 | Primary | NVD | 10.0 | 3.9 | 6.0 | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H |
| 3.1 | Secondary | GHSA | 10.0 | — | — | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H |
| 4.0 | Primary | cve.org | 7.3 | — | — | CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H |
| 4.0 | Primary | cve.org | 7.3 | — | — | CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H |
| 4.0 | Secondary | NVD | 7.3 | — | — | CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X |
| 4.0 | Secondary | GHSA | 7.3 | — | — | CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H |